Smash Cash
SMASH CASH WHITEPAPER
Abstract
We propose to introduce a decentralized token named SMASH that uses zero knowledge proofs or zk-SNARKS to ensure Anonymous transactions for 10 tokens on 15 different blockchains.
AVAX, Harmony ONE, MoonRiver, Dai, FANTOM, Arbitrum, BNB, ETHER, XRP, DOT, SOLANA, MATIC, USDC, WETH, QUICK & USDT.
SMASH will be a non-custodial token where smart contracts as well as the funds will not be owned or placed in the custody of a third party or a platform at any point during the service period.
Introduction
With the emergence of Bitcoin, decentralized ledger technologies have become widely discussed by experts, not just limited to the field of cryptocurrency but several other fields such as banking, ITeS to name a few . As Bitcoin became the first decentralized payment system, experts discovered that the absence of a centralized control over the network could lead to more robust, fair, and transparent financial systems.
Thus, Bitcoin inspired the development of many other decentralized systems with a variety of different features. However, as more and more people ventured into cryptocurrency based transactions, privacy and anonymity became the centerpiece. Our endeavor is to create a cryptocurrency that is supported by a wide range of blockchains and one that eschews privacy and liquidity.
Smash Cash Protocol
SmashCash uses and adopts zk-SNARKs , a novel form of zero-knowledge cryptography. The strong privacy guarantee of SmashCash is derived from the fact that shielded transactions in SmashCash can be fully encrypted on the blockchain, yet still be verified as valid under the network’s consensus rules by using zk-SNARK proofs.
The acronym zk-SNARK stands for “Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge,” and refers to a proof construction where one can prove possession of certain /information, e.g. a secret key, without revealing that information, and without any interaction between the prover and verifier.
“Zero-knowledge” proofs allow one party (the prover) to prove to another (the verifier) that a statement is true, without revealing any information beyond the validity of the statement itself. For example, given the hash of a random number, the prover could convince the verifier that there indeed exists a number with this hash value, without revealing what it is.
In a zero-knowledge “Proof of Knowledge” the prover can convince the verifier not only that the number exists, but that they in fact know such a number – again, without revealing any information about the number.
“Succinct” zero-knowledge proofs can be verified within a few milliseconds, with a proof length of only a few hundred bytes even for statements about programs that are very large.
Evaluation protocol
A non-interactive evaluation protocol
A non-interactive evaluation protocol
The non-interactive version of the evaluation protocol basically consists of publishing Ted’s first message as the CRS. Recall that the purpose of the protocol is to obtain the hiding E ( P ( s ) ) of Jennifer’s polynomial P at a randomly chosen s ∈ F r .
Setup:
Random α ∈ F ∗ r , s ∈ F r are chosen and the CRS:
( E 1 ( 1 ) , E 1 ( s ) , … , E 1 ( s d ) , E 2 ( α ) , E 2 ( α s ) , … , E 2 ( α s d ) ) is published.
Proof: Jennifer computes a = E 1 ( P ( s ) ) and b = E 2 ( α P ( S ) ) using the elements of the CRS, and the fact that E 1 and E 2 support linear combinations.
Verification: Fix the x , y ∈ F r such that a = E 1 ( x ) and b = E 2 ( y ) . Ted computes E ( α x ) = T a t e ( E 1 ( x ) , E 2 ( α ) ) and E ( y ) = T a t e ( E 1 ( 1 ) , E 2 ( y ) ) , and checks that they are equal. (If they are equal it implies α x = y .)
As explained before, Jennifer can only construct a , b that will pass the verification check if a is the hiding of P ( s ) for a polynomial P of degree d known to her. The main difference here is that Ted does not need to know α for the verification check, as he can use the pairing function to compute E ( α x ) only from E 1 ( x ) and E 2 ( α ) . Thus, he does not need to construct and send the first message himself, and this message can simply be fixed in the CRS.
Non-interactive proofs
Non-interactive proofs in the common reference string model
Non-interactive proofs in the common reference string model
The strongest and most intuitive notion of a non-interactive proof is probably the following. In order to prove a certain claim, a prover broadcasts a single message to all parties, with no prior communication of any kind; and anyone reading this message would be convinced of the prover’s claim. This can be shown to be impossible in most cases.
A slightly relaxed notion of non-interactive proof is to allow a common reference string (CRS). In the CRS model, before any proofs are constructed, there is a setup phase where a string is constructed according to a certain randomized process and broadcast to all parties. This string is called the CRS and is then used to help construct and verify proofs. The assumption is that the randomness used in the creation of the CRS is not known to any party – as knowledge of this randomness might enable constructing proofs of false claims.
We will explain how in the CRS model we can convert the verifiable blind evaluation protocol into a non-interactive proof system.
Get more information:
Website ; https://smashcash.io/
Whitepaper : https://smashcash.gitbook.io/whitepaper/
Medium : https://medium.com/@smashcash
Telegram : https://t.me/smashcashio
Twitter : https://twitter.com/smashcashio
Github : https://github.com/smashcash
#Proof of Authentication
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